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Abstract
Communicating a pension product well is as important as optimising the ﬁnancial value. In a recent
study, we showed that up to 80% of the value of a pension lump sum could be lost if customer
communication failed. In this paper, we extend the simple customer interaction of the earlier con-
tribution to the more challenging lifetime annuity case. Using a simple mobile phone device, the
pension customer can select the life-long optimal investment strategy within minutes. The ﬁnancial
risk trade-off is presented as a trade-off between the pension paid and the number of years the life-
long annuity is guaranteed. The pension payment decreases when investment security increases. The
necessary underlying mathematical ﬁnancial hedging theory is included in the study.
Keywords
Pension; Life-long optimal investment strategy; Customer communication
1. Introduction
It has long been a hen-and-the-egg question in modern pension product development to decide where
to start alleviating the many problems with opaque products that most people fail to understand.
Many pension savers end up receiving suboptimal pension products that might be optimal for other
people. An obvious reason for this is the poor communication. Pension communication has been
notoriously difﬁcult due to opaque products and cases with contradicting interests between pension
providers and pension receivers. Also, ﬁnancial advice is expensive and becomes even more so if it is
based on opaque products with contradicting interests. An extreme solution to this ﬁnancial advice
question is to give all customers the same one-size-ﬁts-all product. Another extreme is to let the
pension saver make all the important investment decisions, even when he is not educated enough to
carry out such a difﬁcult ﬁnancial optimisation.
This paper provides a simple intuitive framework that most pension savers would be able to under-
stand.Within a fewminutes, the pension saver should be able to select the optimal investment strategy
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based on individual preferences of ﬁnancial risk. Our main point is that, during this task, it is not
necessary or relevant to know about the complicated underlying ﬁnancial mathematical hedging. We
suggest solving the ﬁnancial communication problem of the risk of life-long pension annuities by
changing the way that pension products are constructed, so that there is a one-to-one ﬁt between the
simple communication and the complicated underlying ﬁnancial hedging. We believe we offer a
genuine solution to the pension crisis challenge articulated byMerton (2014).We are not aware of any
other solution enabling the pension saver to design the entire investment guarantee within a few
minutes via a simple question that the pension saver can understand.Many alternative pension designs
might be possible in future developments with the same set of positive features. Therefore, the reader
should not dwell too long on our particular design, but on the fact that pension annuity products can
be constructed in a way that pension savers can make informed decisions. Our speciﬁc solution
incorporates many of the suggested pension principles in Merton (2014), shaped in a format that is
simple to implement. Our approach builds on the recent research by Gerrard et al. (2017, 2018) and
Donnelly et al. (2018) where similar tools and investment strategies are provided for the simple lump
sum case. Gerrard et al. (2017, 2018) provide an example of a risk-averse investor who could lose up to
80% of his savings, calculated in certainty equivalents, if mistaken for a riskier investor. This paper
introduces an approach where the pension saver picks his own risk appetite in a simple way that also
exactly back-calculates the pension saver’s optimal investment strategy. A major difference from the
existing pension offers is that the pension saver picks the pension product directly without translation.
The pension saver’s decision has a one-to-one relationship with the ﬁnancial investment strategy.Most
existing pension products would let the pension saver decide whether he is, for example, of high,
medium or low risk. The ﬁnancial institution then translates the pension saver’s message into an
investment strategy, but the pension saver’s real interests might be lost in such a translation. Our
pension design provides the pension saver with the exact investment strategy he asks for. In addition,
the pension saver might change his investment strategy: the ﬁnancial question can be posed again at
any given time, perhaps on a yearly basis, and the pension savermight then either adhere to the original
or update the strategy based on his risk preferences at that time.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we explain how the communication of the
simple lump sum can be generalised to the more complicated life-long annuity case, without com-
promising on the simplicity of ﬁnancial advice, by diving into individual customer Emma’s per-
spective. Section 3 highlights the differences from the classical deﬁned contribution (DC) scheme.
Section 4 discusses various details of the pension product. Section 5 presents the stochastic model.
Section 6 and the Appendices provide all the mathematical details of the pension product.
2. The Pension Product from Customers’ Perspective
Emma is 35 years old and wants to invest £300,000 received from an inheritance. The investment
should cover a real annuity income after her retirement at age 65. The actuaries need to handle the
underlying mortality, inﬂation and investment risk. We require a product that can be presented in a
way that allows her to select her optimal strategy in consistency with her ﬁnancial risk preferences.
Our solution is communicated to her in the following simple way:
∙ What is your age, when do you want to retire and what is the amount you want to invest? (See also
Figure 1.)
∙ Now, use the slider below to choose the number of years for which you want to have a monthly
pension beneﬁt guaranteed.
R. Gerrard et al.
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∙ Half of the time your income will continue life long at a ﬁxed high level. The other half of the time,
it will continue life long at some level between the targeted high level and zero pension.
Figure 2a shows the slider Emma can use in order to see the trade-off between the length of guarantee
and monthly beneﬁt size. All amounts are in real terms, i.e. in today’s values, subject to future
increases with inﬂation. This facilitates communication as the amount can be compared with today’s
purchasing power. Emma can choose between no guarantee, mimicking a classical ﬁnancial product
or a life-long guarantee, mimicking a deferred annuity and hence no exposure to risk. The accom-
panying percentage states the chance of ending up with the worst-case scenario of hitting rock
bottom zero pension once the guaranteed pension income period is over.
Imagine that Emma chooses a guarantee period of 10 years providing her a monthly real income of
£2,453 until at least the age of 75. If investments go well, with a 50% chance, the monthly payments
of £2,453 will continue life long. However, there is also the worst-case scenario, with a probability of
22%, that Emma’s pension income will run out when she reaches 75 years of age. In the remaining
28% case, Emma’s life-long annuity will continue with payouts lower than the targeted £2,453. One
could imagine that Emma would safeguard herself to minimise the consequences of such an
unfortunate investment performance. She could, for example, incorporate the value of her house
when reaching 75 years of age, or buy a second product, perhaps a smaller annuity starting when she
is 75 – but then with a life-long guarantee. The annuity option in this paper could be considered as a
building block in a more diverse ﬁnancial planning of the particular household economy Emma
faces. It is beyond the scope of this research to illustrate how a wide array of annuities could provide
a ﬂexible ﬁnancial tool for individual households’ ﬁnancial planning.
In Figure 2b, we see the trade-off between length of guarantee and monthly beneﬁt Emma faces. Note
that if Emma did not want any guarantee, her most likely pension outcome would exceed £3,000 a
year. Alternatively, if Emma wanted absolute lifetime certainty, the guaranteed income would be
below £1,500. Emma can gain a lot by taking the risk of not buying a guarantee, and such should be
made clear to her via the graph provided. Emma can also discover that by increasing the age at which
pay-outs start in Figure 1, a life-long annuity becomes substantially cheaper.
Figure 1. The customer prespeciﬁes some points for the pension product. The age is used to
determine the mortality rate.
Self-selection and risk sharing in a modern world of life-long annuities
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3. Comparison with Traditional-DC Scheme
In this section, we compare the proposed pension product to a typical DC scheme where at retire-
ment the lump sum is converted to an annuity.
3.1. Guaranteed Income
In the DC scheme, the pensioner is exposed to (a) risk from the ﬁnancial market, i.e. investment
performance in nominal terms, (b) inﬂation risk, i.e. uncertain development of average living cost
and (c) mortality risk, i.e. ﬂuctuations of the annuity price at retirement. These three risks make the
ﬁnal pension hard to predict. Financial planning is, therefore, a challenge for most pension savers
holding traditional DC schemes. Our proposed pension product has a clearly stated minimum
monthly income, expressed in real terms, aiding the ﬁnancial planning.
3.2. Performance
We highlight two areas where our suggested pension product seems to outperform the classical DC
scheme. First, in DC schemes, risky investments cease at retirement, whereas in our product
investments stop at the end of the guarantee period. Those extra years of investment provide our
pension saver with either a higher average return or a lower risk. This is because our pension saver
Figure 2. The top ﬁgure shows how the customer can choose the length of guarantee via a slider.
This then determines the size of the monthly beneﬁt and the probability of a zero pension after
the guarantee period. The bottom ﬁgure shows the trade-off between guarantee and monthly
beneﬁt. In our example, Emma chose a guarantee of 10 years that yielded a monthly real income
of £2,453 after retirement.
R. Gerrard et al.
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has more years to diversify the ﬁnancial investment risk. Second, in our proposed life annuity
product, the pension saver receives additional returns equal to the mortality rate. The full trans-
parency of our pooled mortality provides our pension saver with a signiﬁcant extra life-long return.
In a DC scheme, the added mortality return is opaque and hidden, hence it is expected to be on the
lower side. Both features of our product are expected to result in a signiﬁcantly higher ﬁnal pension,
which is the direct ﬁnancial beneﬁt. More importantly, there is also an indirect beneﬁt stemming
from the fact that our pension saver is more likely to pick the ﬁnancial risk proﬁle sought, see next.
3.3. Communication
In a classical DC scheme, it is necessary to determine the risk preferences of the pension saver. This is
usually done indirectly by means of a procedure that is unrelated with the actual pension, raising the
chance of miscommunication and investment in assets that do not ﬁt the actual needs. In our
proposed product, the pension saver can directly pick the level of risk sought. He can directly see the
trade-off between guarantee and monthly beneﬁt and can pick anything between a no-guarantee
product with highest monthly pay-out and a deferred annuity which bears no risk but at the same
time gives minimal monthly income. He can also buy more than one product, for example a deferred
annuity that starts paying out at age 85 as well as a 20-year guarantee starting at 65. Finally, the
choice can be changed at any time by either taking (parts) of the money out or changing the
guarantee period.
4. Additional Details
4.1. The Customer Reveals His Risk Appetite
In the above example, Emma revealed her risk appetite in much the same way as proposed for the
lump sum case in Gerrard et al. (2017, 2018). By specifying the required guarantee length, Emma
directly speciﬁes her ﬁnancial risk appetite. A subsequent simple back-calculation provides us with
Emma’s optimal investment strategy. We are in the fortunate situation that the single most important
ﬁnancial risk question Emma faces is one that she understands, is directly linked to her pension, and
she can give an immediate answer to: she wants 10 years of guarantee. Perhaps, this is due to
children ﬁnishing education by then, and her willingness to sell her house when she is 75 renting a
smaller apartment instead. Selling the house would only be necessary if investment income turned
out to be too disadvantageous. This is rather unlikely and Emma may maintain her current lifestyle
without having to withdraw further from her assets including her house. From a regulatory per-
spective, the pension provider selling the annuity has a full record, for future control purposes, of the
ﬁnancial communication: Emma answered the simple question posed to her with a 10-year period of
guarantee ending at the age of 75. The one-to-one ﬁt between communication and pension product
drastically reduces the burden of recording the ﬁnancial advice.
4.2. Annuity Principle
The pension system introduced in this paper uses the annuity overlay fund introduced in Bräutigam
et al. (2017) and motivated by Donnelly et al. (2013, 2014) and Stamos (2008). As the authors point
out, while the pooled annuity overlay fund includes the word annuity, the concept is quite distinct
Self-selection and risk sharing in a modern world of life-long annuities
5
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S135732171800020X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.67.229, on 08 Feb 2019 at 13:07:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
from that of a standard life annuity. The main difference is that longevity risk is not transferred to an
insurer, but is shared, instead, among the members of the pension fund. The result is an annuity that
is transparent in its costs and is actuarially fair.
Whenever an individual in the pension fund dies, his wealth is distributed to the survivors in an
actuarially fair way, i.e. at every instant the expected gain (gain when someone else dies less loss of
wealth if own death occurs) is zero. Given that the pool is large enough (e.g. 1,000, refer to Donnelly
et al., 2013, 2014 for how surprisingly small these annuity pools need to be), the mortality gains are
given by
λiðtÞXiðtÞdt;
where Xi is the wealth of individual i and λi(t) the individual’s force of mortality. The relative annuity
gains with magnitude λi(t) coincide with the growth rate of a fairly priced life-long standard annuity,
hence longevity risk is automatically hedged. If Emma reaches the optimal investment scenario,
which happens most of the times, the payouts will continue life long.
4.3. The Overall Principle of Hedging and the Importance of Technical
simplicity
The most important feature of our new class of pension products is the straightforward commu-
nication. Another obvious advantage is its simple technical implementation that will help minimising
technical errors from actuarial and ﬁnancial ofﬁces. The simplicity will ensure that actuaries and
ﬁnancial experts are on top of things so that a one-to-one ﬁt is achieved between what actuaries and
ﬁnancial experts tell other departments and the board of directors and what these interested agents
actually get. The hedging strategy can be expressed in terms of a simple probability that actuaries
immediately understand. The optimal investment strategy before introducing risk sharing is given by
investing the amount
300; 000ert +
Ð t
0
λiðsÞds|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
value of 300; 000 at t
P 0≤ Xi ðTiÞ +Pið0Þ300; 000 μrð ÞTi|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
terminalwealth of unconstrained strategy corrected by drift
≤GUiðTiÞ j Xi ðtÞ
0BBB@
1CCCA
in the risky fund, where μ is the average mean return on the risky asset, r the average inﬂation per
year, t the time passed since commencement, Ti the time from commencement until the end of the
guarantee period, λi the force of mortality of individual i, Xi the wealth of individual i following an
optimal unconstrained strategy, Pið0Þ the initial price of the hedge, and GUiðTiÞ the actuarially fair
price at Ti for a life-long annuity; refer to section 6 for further details.
4.4. How Risk is Pooled
In what follows, our pension saver can invest only in an inﬂation fund or a risky fund. We assume
that both have some risk that has to be taken into account in the ﬁnancial hedge of the underlying
long-term target. In Gerrard et al. (2017, 2018), it is assumed that a risk-free inﬂation fund exists at
any given time. Here, we relax this assumption and allow some risk involved when hedging inﬂation.
Most of the time this is not a concern as pension savers can adjust their investments and maintain the
same level of risk as if the inﬂation fund were risk-free (see section 4.4). However, in some rare cases
R. Gerrard et al.
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individuals want less risk than the safest option. This can be, for example, the case when 100% in the
inﬂation fund still bears too much risk. The individuals can then take advantage of being part of a
group. More speciﬁcally, the individuals’ lack of risk appetite can be circumvented by transferring
risk to the rest of the group with a risk appetite (see section 4.4). Finally, in extremely rare cases the
entire group loses its aggregate risk appetite, rendering the inﬂow of investments with risk appetite
necessary. This implies the need for an intermediary whose role is described in section 4.4.
4.4.1. Individual
Once the individual has speciﬁed the length of his guarantee period, an optimal ﬁnancial hedge is
back-calculated. The ﬁnancial hedge is based on a risk-free inﬂation fund and a risky fund. It implies
at every point in time a certain risk appetite and an optimal level of inﬂation hedge. When con-
sidering a risky inﬂation fund, those levels can be recovered by adjusting the proportions of the
investments. This result is obtained by lowering the level of investment in the risky fund until the risk
appetite from the ﬁnancial hedge is achieved. This implies a slight increase of the investment in the
risky inﬂation fund compared to the original investment in the risk-free fund.
4.4.2. Group
In rare cases, the risk appetite of the individual is so small that risk has to be transferred from the
individual to the group. The group, then, chooses, as a solidarity of being part of the group, to
borrow money at the risk-free inﬂation rate and include it in its investments. This allows our pension
system to work almost frictionless.
4.4.3. Intermediary
In extremely rare cases with insufﬁcient risk appetite in the group to cover the risk in the inﬂation
fund, an intermediary provides capital with risk appetite. Note that the only promise the inter-
mediary makes is to provide risk capital close to the market value. Therefore, it does not cost much
to participate. Even so, the intermediary is allowed to charge some administration cost for being the
“market maker” to ensure that risk appetite is available at all times and, therefore, ensure the
underlying guarantee.
5. The Stochastic Model Underlying the Financial Hedge
In this section, we present the ﬁnancial model used for the ﬁnancial hedging. We choose the simplest
possible such model for the sake of transparency, noting that this research output is not aiming for
optimal ﬁnancial modelling. While in this paper we are concerned with connecting investment
strategies with annuities and achieving a one-to-one communication to the customer, let us for a
second assume that we change the underlying ﬁnancial model. The ﬁnancial hedge is about the target
income and the length of the guarantee. Changing the ﬁnancial model is expected to only slightly
affect the size of the forecasted target income for given guarantees, however the decision of the
pension saver remains more or less of the same nature; this approach seems robust under underlying
ﬁnancial model variations. Therefore, we pick the simplest most transparent model comprising a
risk-free inﬂation fund S0≡1–note that we operate in real terms–and a risky fund S1 described via
dS1ðtÞ= μS1ðtÞdt + σS1ðtÞdWðtÞ; (1)
where μ, σ> 0, S1(0)=1 and W is a standard Brownian motion.
Note that the ﬁnancial model (1) is simpler than the investment universe provided to the pension
customer consisting of a risky asset and an inﬂation fund, where also the latter carries some risk. The
Self-selection and risk sharing in a modern world of life-long annuities
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risky inﬂation fund is expected to be constructed in a way that over the long run at least a return of
inﬂation is obtained plus an additional return corresponding to the risk taken in the risky inﬂation
fund. In section 6.5, we will see that a risk transfer can be made from the real investment universe of
a risky inﬂation fund and a more risky fund to the artiﬁcial investment universe of a risk-free
inﬂation fund and a risky fund. The transfer simply looks at the risk that the ﬁnancial hedging
strategy suggests and downplays the risky fund a little bit while upgrading the risky inﬂation fund a
little bit. This is done until the pension customer has the same risk-return proﬁle, as suggested by the
very simple transparent ﬁnancial model (1) consisting of an infeasible risk-free inﬂation fund and a
risky asset.
In the example of section 2, we assume
μ= 0:0337; σ = 0:1538;
corresponding to 1-year mean returns and standard deviations of 3.43% and 16% for the risky asset
(see equations (10) and (11)). The 3.43% return and 16% volatility of the risky asset are from
Guillén et al. (2006), based on the empirical results in the book “Triumph of the optimist” (Dimson
et al., 2002). In order to price a pension product, the pension provider requires an estimate of the
mortality rate, λ(t), of the customer. In Figure 1, this is done by asking for customer’s age. In practice,
one may consider more covariates aiming to achieve a better estimate, however such is beyond the
scope of this paper. For illustration purposes, we choose for simplicity the mortality rates from the
National Life Tables, England, for females in the period 2013–2015 Ofﬁce for National Statistics
(2017). By using this data, we implicitly assume no future period effect on the mortality rates. Again,
adopting a more realistic model is possible, but not the focus of this paper. Other information the
pension provider receives is the amount of money that the customer wants to invest and the time
when payouts should start.
To derive a customer-tailored pension product, it is important to communicate correctly the risk
appetite of the customer. Following Gerrard et al. (2017, 2018), it is possible to describe the risk
appetite with only one parameter that the customer understands. This is in contrast to an abstract
risk aversion parameter of a utility function which is hard to communicate. In Gerrard et al. (2017,
2018), it is shown that, by specifying a minimum amount the pensioner wants to have guaranteed, an
optimal investment strategy can be back-calculated, yielding a practically optimal performance
speciﬁc to the customer’s risk appetite. In section 6.3, we extend this result to the annuity case in
which the customer now chooses how long he wants payouts guaranteed. From equation (8), one can
then calculate the corresponding size of monthly payouts, so that there is a 50% chance that these
continue life long after the guarantee period.
Note that the money paid in should be invested as long as possible. In particular, investments should
not stop at retirement, as such would lead to signiﬁcant losses in expected performance. In our
implementation, we choose the investment to last to the end of the guarantee period. A longer
investment horizon is not directly possible as it is a priori not known how long the money on the
pension account will last. The customer himself is not concerned with these details and only sees
Figure 2, visualising the trade-off between guarantee length and monthly beneﬁt size. Once the
decision is made, the pension provider is left with an investment strategy due to be implemented.
Whenever an investor in the pension fund dies, his wealth is distributed according to formula (4).
The distribution of wealth is actuarially fair, meaning that, given the individual’s mortality rate, the
expected gain at every instant is exactly zero. Note that gains occur if others in the fund die and a
R. Gerrard et al.
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loss occurs with own death, the full wealth being redistributed. In Proposition 1, we show that in a
large pension pool, payouts from it have little volatility and the extra return from entering the
annuity scheme is very close to the mortality rate, λ(t).
The theoretical optimal investment strategy is derived in a Black–Scholes world, hence needs to be
adjusted to account for model (1). The main idea is that the strategy is adjusted in a way that the
calculated optimal risk exposure from the Black–Scholes world is preserved. This is straightforward
to do as long as all individuals in the pension fund have enough risk appetite for the adjustment to be
feasible, i.e. equation (13) is fulﬁlled for everyone. If equation (13) is violated for an individual, the
risk-sharing principle kicks in: those with sufﬁcient risk appetite in the pension fund offer those who
lack risk appetite a risk-free inﬂation return; refer to section 6.5.1 for more details. The result is that
via this risk-sharing principle, everyone maintains the same risk as derived from the Black–
Scholes world.
6. The Full Investment Model Including Mortality Risk
In this section, we incorporate mortality in our ﬁnancial model. While almost any approach to
mortality risk can be combined with our new pension design, we have particular preference for the
modern risk-sharing approach of Bräutigam et al. (2017) as there are no hidden costs in it to the
customers that cover each other’s risk almost without any long-term cost. But again, what follows
aims to just illustrate that it is possible to provide an easily communicated pension design including
mortality risk. Just as our pension design itself may have several variations with similar positive
properties, the underlying mortality approach used for the annuity may also take different shapes
without compromising on our overall ideas of a simple pension product that is easy to communicate
and where the entire investment strategy can be back-calculated from a short conversation with the
pension saver. As pointed out in section 5, we will start with two assets: a risk-free inﬂation bond S0
and a risky asset S1. The ﬁnancial hedging principle is based on this simple model; mortality risk will
be incorporated in section 6.2. The real investment universe the pension customer faces has a risky
inﬂation fund rather than a risk-free inﬂation bond. Therefore, there is some risk transfer adjustment
to be done, so that the pension saver can maintain the risk–return relationship that the ﬁnancial
hedging suggests. This is carried out in section 6.5.
6.1. Two Asset Case: Inflation Fund and Risky Fund
Let us ﬁrst restate our simple transparent ﬁnancial model used for ﬁnancial hedging. There are two
assets: a risk-free inﬂation bond, S0, and a risky asset S1, described by
dS0ðtÞ= rS0ðtÞdt; dS1ðtÞ= μS1ðtÞdt + σS1ðtÞdWðtÞ; t≥ 0 (2)
where μ, σ, r> 0 and S0(0)= S1(0)=1. The only source of randomness is the standard Brownian
motion, W, deﬁned on a complete probability space ðΩ;F ;PÞ. The information available to the
investor is represented by the ﬁltration F t = σfWðsÞ; s 2 0; tg _ N ðPÞ, where NðPÞ denotes the
collection of all P-null sets so that the ﬁltration obeys the usual conditions. We denote by Xi(t) the
amount of wealth invested by individual i in the fund at time t, of which πi(t) is invested in the risky
asset and the remaining in the risk-free asset. There is also a deterministic stream of payments into
Self-selection and risk sharing in a modern world of life-long annuities
9
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S135732171800020X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.67.229, on 08 Feb 2019 at 13:07:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
the fund deﬁned by dCiðtÞ over the time interval (t,t + dt). Hence,
dXiðtÞ= r XiðtÞπiðtÞð Þdt + μdt + σdWðtÞð ÞπiðtÞ + dCiðtÞ
=XiðtÞdt + θdt + dWðtÞð ÞσπiðtÞ + dCiðtÞ; ð3Þ
where θ= (μ − r)/σ is the market price of risk.
6.2. Adding Pooled Mortality Gains
Next, we consider a ﬁxed, deterministic rate of mortality and the risk pooling principle of Bräutigam
et al. (2017), and explain how actuarially fair mortality gains can be incorporated in our pension
system. In this attempt, we make two assumptions:
A1 The mortality rate of the individuals is known, with no extra parameter uncertainty.
A2 The pension fund has an inﬁnite number of individuals.
We denote the mortality rate of individual i by λi(t). Whenever an individual in the pension fund dies,
his remaining wealth is distributed to the survivors in the pension fund. We denote by LðtÞ the index
set of people alive at time t. The wealth is distributed in an actuarially fair way. Assume that
individual j is alive at time t − . If he dies at time t, then the surviving pension saver i≠j receives
λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ P
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
XjðtÞ½1 +AjðtÞ; (4)
where A is an adjustment factor implicitly deﬁned by equation (A1) which converges to zero with
growing pool size. More precisely, the individual mortality gains at time t, when individual j dies, are
given by
dHiðtÞ=
λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1+AiðtÞ½ P
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
XiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ ; if i≠ j
XiðtÞ; if i= j;
8><>:
where the case i= j is derived as a consequence of the deﬁnition of A.
Proposition 1. The expected mortality gain at every instant is given by
E dHiðtÞ j F t ; i alive at t½ = 0;
hence wealth is distributed in an actuarially fair way. In addition, conditional on surviving, the
expected mortality gain is given by
E dHiðtÞ j F t ; i alive at t½ = λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ 
´ 1 λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ P
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
0B@
1CAdt;
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and the variance by
Var dHiðtÞ j F t ; i alive at t½ =
λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ P
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
0B@
1CA
2
´
X
j2LðtÞ n i
X2j ðtÞ 1 +AjðtÞ
 2
λjðtÞdt:
Then, with growing pool size, the variance of the actuarial gains converges to zero and the expected
gains, conditional on not dying, to λi(t)Xi(t)dt.
Proof. See Appendix A. ∎
In the following, we assume that the pool size is large enough so that any noise can be ignored. Then,
if the ﬁnancial model (3) of the previous section is combined with the annuity pool, as long as the
individual is alive the development of wealth is given by
dXiðtÞ= rXiðtÞ + ðμrÞπiðtÞ + λiðtÞXiðtÞð Þdt + σπiðtÞdWðtÞ + dCiðtÞ: (5)
This means that when an optimal strategy πi is considered, such should incorporate the additional
gains λi(t)Xi(t)dt.
Proposition 2. Under model (5), the optimal strategy maximising U(Xi(Ti)) for an exponential utility
function, UðxÞ=γ1i eγix, is given by
πi ðtÞ=CierðTitÞ
Ð Ti
t
λiðsÞds;
where Ci= θ/(σγi). Under this strategy, the evolution of the optimal wealth is given by
Xi ðtÞ= ert +
Ð t
0
λiðsÞds Xið0Þ + gið0Þ½  + erðTitÞ
Ð Ti
t
λiðsÞdsRi θt +WðtÞ½ giðtÞ; (6)
where
giðtÞ=
ðTi
t
erðstÞ
Ð s
t
λiðuÞdudCiðsÞ
and Ri=Ciσ.
Proof. See Appendix B. ∎
Remark. Following Gerrard et al. (2017, 2018), we assume that γi = θe
rTi
Ð Ti
0
λiðsÞds = ðσXið0ÞÞ so that
Ci =Xið0ÞerTi +
Ð Ti
0
λiðsÞds.
6.3. From Lump Sum to Annuities
When considering a retirement product, the focus should not be on a lump sum but on the monthly
income level at retirement and the duration of payment. In this section, we extend the lump sum case
to an annuity.
Assume that the pension saver has T0i years until retirement. Assume that individual i chooses to
have guaranteed payout duration of Di years with payouts of dCi. Payouts stop, however, at the
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time of death. We set Ti =T0i +Di. Then, the discounted remaining guaranteed amount of payments
as at t>0 is given by
GLiðtÞ=
ðTi
T0i _t
erðstÞNiðsÞdCiðsÞ;
where Ni has value 1 while the individual is alive, otherwise it becomes 0. We also consider the
optimal outcome to be a life-long payout, hence we deﬁne the top value based on receipt of payments
until death
GUiðtÞ=
ð1
T0i _t
erðstÞNiðsÞdCiðsÞ:
Then, t years from now,
GLiðtÞ : =E½GLiðtÞ j F t=
ðTi
T0i _t
erðstÞ
SiðsÞ
SiðtÞ dCiðsÞ;
where SiðaÞ= exp 
Ð a
0λiðuÞdu
 
is the survival function, i.e. the unconditional probability of
surviving until a certain age, and
GUiðtÞ : =E½GUiðtÞ j F t=
ð1
T0i _t
erðstÞ
SiðsÞ
SiðtÞ dCiðsÞ:
Note that
GLiðtÞ=giðtÞ +
ðT0i _t
t
erðstÞ
Ð s
t
λiðuÞdudCiðsÞ;
GUiðtÞ= erðTitÞ
Ð Ti
t
λiðsÞdsGUiðTiÞgiðtÞ +
ðT0i _t
t
erðstÞ
Ð s
t
λiðuÞdudCiðsÞ:
We can now modify the unconstrained strategy of the previous section. The aim is to guarantee the
payment stream for a period of Di years, while maximising the chance of getting the payouts life
long. Technically, this translates to ﬁnding an optimal strategy maximising U(Xi(Ti)), for a given
utility function U, subject to the constraint 0=GLi(Ti)≤Xi(Ti)≤GUi(Ti). Note that the optimal
strategy will then naturally satisfy that, at any given time, the wealth remains always above the price
of an annuity with Di years payout and below a life-long annuity.
Proposition 3. For
GLið0Þ≤Xið0Þ +
ðT0i _t
t
erðstÞ
Ð s
t
λiðuÞdudCiðsÞ≤GUið0Þ;
there exists an optimal strategy yielding wealth Xi ðtÞ with
Xi ðTiÞ=
GLiðTiÞ; if Xi ðTiÞ +Pið0Þ<0
Xi ðTiÞ +Pið0Þ; if 0≤Xi ðTiÞ +Pið0Þ≤GUiðTiÞ
GUiðTiÞ; if Xi ðTiÞ +Pið0Þ>GUiðTiÞ
8><>: : (7)
Furthermore, it holds for all t ∈ (0, Ti] that
GLiðtÞ≤Xi ðtÞ +
ðT0i _t
t
erðstÞ
Ð s
t
λiðuÞdudCiðsÞ≤GUiðtÞ:
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The corresponding optimal strategy is given by
πi ðtÞ=CierðTitÞ
Ð Ti
t
λiðsÞdsP GLiðTiÞ≤Xi ðTiÞ +Pið0ÞRiθTi ≤GUiðTiÞ j Xi ðtÞ
 
;
where Pið0Þ is deﬁned via
Xið0Þ=GUið0ÞXið0Þσ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ti
p
H
GUið0ÞXið0ÞerTi
Ð Ti
0
λiðsÞdsPið0Þ
Xið0Þσ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ti
p
0@ 1A24
H GLið0ÞXið0Þe
rTi
Ð Ti
0
λiðsÞdsPið0Þ
Xið0Þσ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ti
p
0@ 1A35;
HðxÞ=xΦðxÞ +ϕðxÞ, and Φ and ϕ are, respectively, the standard normal cumulative distribution and
density functions.
Proof. See Appendix C. ∎
6.4. The Probabilities
In this section, we want to ﬁnd the monthly payment stream dCi corresponding to monthly constant
real income. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne CiðtÞ=
P 12t
s= 1Mie
rs =12, t>T0i and aim to ﬁnd Mi, i.e. the
monthly income measured in today’s purchasing power, such that
P Xi ðTDi Þ> 0 j TDi >Ti
 
= 50% ;
where TDi is the time until death, i.e. given that individual i outlives the guarantee period, there is a
50% chance that the payment stream will continue life long. Assuming independence of the time of
death and the performance of the investments, we have that
P½Xi ðTDi Þ> 0 j TDi >Ti=
ð1
Ti
fiðtÞ
SiðTiÞP½X

i ðtÞ>0dt
=
ð1
Ti
fiðtÞ
SiðTiÞP X

i ðTiÞ>
ðt
Ti
e
rðsTiÞ
Ð s
Ti
λiðuÞdu
dCiðsÞ
 	
dt
=
ð1
Ti
fiðtÞ
SiðTiÞP X

i ðTiÞ>MierTi
X12t
s= 12Ti
e

Ð s = 12
Ti
λiðuÞdu
" #
dt
where fiðtÞ= λiðtÞ exp 
Ð t
0λiðsÞds
 
is the mortality density. Deﬁne
Pið0Þ= erTi +
Ð Ti
0
λiðsÞds½Xið0Þ + gið0Þ +Pið0Þ, then, in distribution,
Xi ðTiÞ= max min Pið0Þ +RiθTi +Ri
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ti
p
Z;GUiðTiÞ
 
;GLiðTiÞ

 
;
where Z is a standard normal random variable. Hence,
0:5=
ð1
Ti
fiðtÞ
SiðTiÞΦ
MierTi
P12t
s=12Ti
e

Ð s = 12
Ti
λiðuÞdu +RiθTi +Pið0Þ
Ri
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ti
p
26664
37775dt:
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If CiðtÞ= 0 for t<T0i , the above can be rewritten to
0:5=
ð1
Ti
fiðtÞ
SiðTiÞΦ
MierTi
P12t
s= 12T0i
e

Ð s = 12
Ti
λiðuÞdu +RiθTi + e
rTi +
Ð Ti
0
λiðsÞdsXið0Þ +Pið0Þ
Ri
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ti
p
266664
377775dt
=
ð1
Ti
fiðtÞ
SiðTiÞΦ
Mi
P12t
s=12T0i
e
Ð s = 12
0
λiðuÞdu +Xið0ÞðμrÞTi +Xið0Þ + ePið0Þ
Xið0Þσ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ti
p
266664
377775dt; ð8Þ
where for the last equality we have used that Ri =Xið0ÞerTi +
Ð Ti
0
λiðsÞdsσ, withePið0Þ= erTiÐ Ti0 λiðsÞdsPið0Þ – the cost of the hedge when assuming zero inﬂation. The last equation
can be solved iteratively forMi. Note thatMi does not depend on the inﬂation rate r directly but only
via the excess return μ − r.
6.5. No Risk-Free Asset but an Inflation Fund
We now relax the assumption of a risk-free asset of the previous section. The reason is that nearly
risk-free assets, like bonds, provide a certain nominal return, but a pensioner is more interested in a
return with respect to his purchasing power at retirement. By subtracting the inﬂation rate from an
investment return, one derives the real return which, however, bears some risk.
Abandoning the original risk-free asset S0, we consider now the two assets
deS0ðtÞ=eμeS0ðtÞdt +eσeS0ðtÞdfWðtÞ; dS1ðtÞ= μS1ðtÞdt + σS1ðtÞdWðtÞ; (9)
where μ; eμ; σ; eσ > 0, eS0ð0Þ= S1ð0Þ= 1 and fW;W  is a standard two-dimensional Brownian motion;
the correlation coefﬁcient of the Brownian motions is ρ∈ [ −1,1].
6.5.1. Adjusting for extra risk in the inflation fund and the risk sharing
principle
To account for the change from the risk-free bond model (2) to the inﬂation fund (9), we propose an
ad hoc adjustment to the optimal strategy (7).
The mean return, μ1, and risk, σ1, on £1 in S1 are given by
μ1 =E ðS1ð1ÞS1ð0ÞÞ = S1ð0Þ½ = eμ1; (10)
σ1 =
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
VarðS1ð1ÞÞ
p
=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðeσ21Þe2μ
q
: (11)
In the same fashion for the case when £1 is invested solely in eS0, we derive μ0 and σ0 by replacing μ, σ
in equations (10) and (11) with eμ, eσ. For the risk-free case, i.e. when investing in S0 and S1, the yearly
risk for an individual investing π in S1 is πσ1. When we replace the risk-free fund S0 by the inﬂation
fund eS0, additional risk (and return) needs to be considered. For wealth X and π invested in S1, the
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remaining X − π is invested in eS0 and the yearly risk is given by
π2σ21 + Xπð Þ2σ20 + 2π Xπð Þρσ0σ1
 1 = 2
:
Hence, the risk of individual i is preserved by investing π with
π2 σ21 + σ
2
02ρσ1σ0
 
+ π 2Xiσ20 + 2Xiρσ1σ0
 
+X2i σ
2
0πi 2σ21 = 0:
The solution
π =
Xiσ20Xiρσ1σ0 + ðXiσ20Xiρσ1σ0Þ2ðσ21 + σ202ρσ1σ0ÞðX2i σ20π2i σ21Þ
h i1 = 2
σ21 + σ
2
02ρσ1σ0
(12)
is well-deﬁned for sufﬁciently large πi :
πi ≥Xiσ0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1ρ2
σ21 + σ
2
02ρσ1σ0
s
: (13)
Condition (13) is violated if the individual does not have enough risk appetite, i.e. the optimal
strategy involves less risk than any combination of eS0 and S1 can offer. This leads to the risk sharing
principle. More speciﬁcally, we arrange the people in the pension fund into three groups. Individuals
in groups I and J are those with sufﬁcient risk appetite so that equation (13) holds – see later.
Individuals in group K are those with insufﬁcient risk appetite and given the opportunity to invest in
the risk-free asset S0 instead of the risky inﬂation fund eS0. In turn, the inﬂation fund eS0 replaces S1 as
the risky fund. By slight abuse of notation, we denote by πk , for members of group k∈K, the
amount invested in eS0, whereas the remaining is invested in S0. Strategy πk is adjusted via the risk-
preserving relationship
πk σ1 = π

k σ0:
Note that a solution πk 2 0;Xk½  exists as the members of group K violate condition (13), hence
πk ≤ σ0Xk = σ1.
For the strategy to be feasible, the fund S0 needs to be created internally in the pension fund. This
means that those in group I and J have to short S0 with the amount required by group K. The
aggregate amount that needs to be borrowed by members of I and J is χ =
P
k2K
Xkπk . The
maximum amount individual i∈ (I∪ J) is willing to borrow is
ξi =
πi
σ0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1ρ2
σ21 + σ
2
02ρσ1σ0
q Xi:
The members of group J do not have enough risk appetite for a full support. The subgroups of J are
deﬁned iteratively, starting with
J1 = j 2 K{ : ξj <
πjP
l2K{
πl
χ
8><>:
9>=>;  J:
If J1 is empty, the iteration terminates. Otherwise by the mth iteration, the subgroup Jm⊂J is created:
Jm = j 2 ðK∪ J1    ∪ Jm1Þ{ : ξj <
πjP
l2ðK∪ J1∪ Jm1Þ{
πl
χ
X
l2ðK∪ J1 ∪ Jm1Þ
ξl
0@ 1A
8><>:
9>=>;:
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The iteration stops once an empty set is created. We then deﬁne J= ∪ lJl. All remaining members of
the pension fund are allocated to group I= ðJ ∪KÞ{. The ﬁnal strategies for members of I and J are as
follows: πl in S1, − ql in S0 and the remaining in eS0; ql= ξl for members of J, whereas
ql = πl =
P
i2I
πi
 
χ P
l2ðK∪ JÞ
ξl
 !
for members of I. Finally, πl satisﬁes (12) when Xl is replaced
by Xl + ql.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
The death of an individual is modelled by a counting process Ni(s) with value 1 indicating that the
individual is alive. By deﬁnition, the counting process has intensity
lim
h#0
h1E Ni ðt + hÞ
 NiðtÞ j F t = λiðtÞ1fi alive at tg:
Hence,
HiðtÞ=
X
j
ðt
0
λiðsÞXiðsÞ 1 +AiðsÞ½ NiðsÞP
l
λlðsÞXlðsÞ 1 +AlðsÞ½ NlðsÞ
XjðsÞ 1 +AjðsÞ
 
dNjðsÞ
+
ðt
0
XiðsÞ 1 +AiðsÞ½ dNiðsÞ;
where Aj satisﬁes
AjðtÞ=
λjðtÞXjðtÞ 1 +AjðtÞ
 P
lλlðtÞXlðtÞNlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ λjðtÞXjðtÞNjðtÞ
; (A1)
which can be solved iteratively. Feasibility of this strategy is ensured as
P
i
HiðtÞ= 0. Furthermore, if
individual j dies at time t,
dHjðtÞ= λjðtÞXjðtÞ½1 +AjðtÞP
l
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ NlðtÞ
XjðtÞ½1 +AjðtÞXjðtÞ½1 +AjðtÞ=Xj;
where the last equality follows from equation (A1). The expected growth of the gains dHi at time t
given that i is alive at t − is given by
E dHiðtÞ j F t ;NiðtÞ= 1½ =
λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ 
P
j2LðtÞ
λjðtÞXjðtÞ 1 +AjðtÞ
 
dtP
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ dt
= 0;
hence the mortality pooling is actuarially fair at any time. Similarly,
E dHiðtÞ j F t ;NiðtÞ= 1½ =
λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ 
P
j2LðtÞ n i
λjðtÞXjðtÞ 1 +AjðtÞ
 
dtP
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
= λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½  1 λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ P
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
0B@
1CAdt:
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For the variance we have
Var dHiðtÞ j F t ;NiðtÞ= 1½ =
λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ P
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
0B@
1CA
2
´
X
j
Var½XjðtÞ 1 +AjðtÞ
 
dNiðtÞ j F t ;NiðtÞ=1
=
λiðtÞXiðtÞ 1 +AiðtÞ½ P
l2LðtÞ
λlðtÞXlðtÞ 1 +AlðtÞ½ 
0B@
1CA
2
´
X
j2LðtÞ n i
X2j ðtÞ 1 +AjðtÞ
 2
λjðtÞdt:
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
For notational convenience, in what follows subscript i is suppressed. Deﬁne the discounted wealth
process
YðtÞ= erðTtÞ +
Ð T
t
λðsÞds XðtÞ + gðtÞð Þ: (B1)
As Y(T)=X(T), maximising E[U(X(T))] amounts to maximising E[U(Y(T))]. Furthermore,
dYðtÞ= ðμrÞerðTtÞ +
Ð T
t
λðsÞdsπðtÞdt + σerðTtÞ +
Ð T
t
λðsÞdsπðtÞdWðtÞ: (B2)
Based on standard optimal control theory, the optimal value function at time t is given by
Vðt; yÞ= sup
π
E½UðYðTÞÞ j YðtÞ= y; strategy π is used:
The Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation describing the dynamics of V is given by
sup
π
Vt + θσe
rðTtÞ +
Ð T
t
λðsÞdsπðtÞVy + 12 σ
2π2ðtÞe2rðTtÞ +2
Ð T
t
λðsÞdsVyy
 
= 0;
where Vt, Vy and Vyy are the partial derivatives with respect to t and y (ﬁrst and second order). By
utilising the ﬁrst-order condition in the optimisation problem above, the optimal value of π is
πðt; yÞ= θ
σ
erðTtÞ
Ð T
t
λðsÞds Vy
Vyy
;
hence V satisﬁes
Vt θ
2
2
V2y
Vyy
=0:
Subject to the boundary condition
VðT; yÞ= 1
γ
eγy;
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it is straightforward to show that
Vðt; yÞ= 1
γ
exp  θ
2
2
ðTtÞγy
 
;
yielding the optimal strategy
πðt; yÞ=CerðTtÞ
Ð T
t
λðsÞds
and
YðtÞ= y0 +Cσ θt +WðtÞð Þ: (B3)
From equations (B1) and (B3), we then get the optimal wealth equation (6).
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma. Wealth X** described in equation (7) is feasible.
Proof. Deﬁne the process
PðtÞ=XðtÞ +Pð0Þ;
where X*(t) satisﬁes equation (6). Further, deﬁne the martingale measureQ such thatWℚ(t)=W(t) + θt
is a standard Brownian motion. Hence,
PðtÞ=Pð0Þ +RWQðtÞ:
Conditional on the history of the process up until time t> 0,
PðTÞ=Pð0Þ +RðWQðtÞ +
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
ZÞ;
where Z is a standard normal random variable under Q. We note that
PðTÞ>GUðTÞ ,WQðtÞ +
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
Z>R1 GUðTÞPð0Þð Þ , Z>dU;
where
dU =
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp R
1 GUðTÞPð0Þð ÞWQðtÞ
 
and, similarly, we have that P(T)<GL(T) is in distribution equivalent to Z< dL with
dL =
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp R
1 GLðTÞPð0Þð ÞWQðtÞ
 
:
The price of Y**(T)=X**(T) at time t is given by the present value of wealth at time t under Q:
YðtÞ=EQ max GLðTÞ;min GUðTÞ;PðTÞð Þð ÞjFQt
 
=
ðdL
1
GLðTÞϕðzÞdz +
ð1
dU
GUðTÞϕðzÞdz +
ðdU
dL
Pð0Þ +RðWQðtÞ +
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
zÞ
 
ϕðzÞdz
=GLðTÞΦðdLÞ +GUðTÞ 1ΦðdUÞ½  + Pð0Þ +RWQðtÞ
 
ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞ½ 
R
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
ϕðdUÞϕðdLÞ½ 
=GUðTÞR
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
HðdUÞHðdLÞ½ :
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As H’(x)=Φ(x)∈ (0,1) and dL<dU, we deduce that
0≤HðdUÞHðdLÞ≤ dUdL = 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp R
1ðGUðTÞGLðTÞÞ:
Returning to the standard measure ℙ, we can write both dL and dU as functions of t and w=W(t):
dLðt;wÞ= 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp R
1 GLðTÞPð0Þð Þwθt
 
;
dUðt;wÞ= 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp R
1 GUðTÞPð0Þð Þwθt
 
;
with
∂dL
∂t
= θﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp +
dL
2ðTtÞ ;
∂dL
∂w
= 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp ;
and similarly for dU. By exploiting the expressions for dL and dU, we rewrite Y
**(t)= η(t,W(t)), where
η satisﬁes
∂η
∂t
=
R
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp HðdUÞHðdLÞ½ R
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
H
0 ðdUÞ ∂dU∂t H
0 ðdLÞ ∂dL∂t
 	
=
R
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp HðdUÞHðdLÞ½ 
+Rθ ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞ½  R
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp dUΦðdUÞdLϕðdLÞ½ 
=
R
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp ϕðdUÞϕðdLÞ½  +Rθ ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞ½ ;
∂η
∂w
=R
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
H
0 ðdUÞ ∂dU∂w H
0 ðdLÞ ∂dL∂w
 
=R ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞ½ ;
∂2η
∂w2
= Rﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp ϕðdUÞϕðdLÞ½ ;
so that
dYðtÞ= ∂η
∂t
+
1
2
∂2η
∂w2
 
dt +
∂η
∂w
dWðtÞ=R ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞð Þ θdt + dWðtÞð Þ:
Now equation (B2) states
dYðtÞ= σerðTtÞ +
Ð T
t
λðsÞdsπðtÞ θdt + dWðtÞð Þ;
for YðtÞ= erðTtÞ +
Ð T
t
λðsÞdsfXðtÞ + gðtÞg, hence Y**(t) is obtained via the strategy
πðt; yÞ=CerðTtÞ +
Ð T
t
λðsÞds ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞð Þ:
We now prove that it is possible to choose P(0) in such a way that the budget constraint X(0)= x0 is
satisﬁed. The budget constraint is
Yð0Þ= ηð0; 0Þ
=GUðTÞR
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
H R1
GUðTÞPð0Þﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
H R1GLðTÞPð0Þﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
  	
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with its derivative with respect to P(0) given by
Φ R1
GUðTÞPð0Þﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
Φ R1GLðTÞPð0Þﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
> 0:
The smallest and largest possible values are therefore the limits as P(0)→ ±∞: at the top end,
GUðTÞR
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
lim
q!1
ðR1ðGUðTÞqÞ = ﬃﬃﬃTp
R1ðGLðTÞqÞ =
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p ΦðzÞdz=GUðTÞ;
and at the bottom end,
GUðTÞR
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
lim
q!1
ðR1ðGUðTÞqÞ = ﬃﬃﬃTp
R1ðGLðTÞqÞ =
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p ΦðzÞdz
=GUðTÞR
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p R1ðGUðTÞqÞﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p R
1ðGLðTÞqÞﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
=GLðTÞ;
as expected. We conclude that it is always possible to ﬁnd a value of P(0) such that the budget
constraint is satisﬁed as long as
GLðTÞ<Yð0Þ<GUðTÞ:
Assuming that this inequality holds, we have a strategy which is feasible.
It is left to show that
GLðtÞ≤XðtÞ≤GUðtÞ:
As
YðtÞ=EQ max GLðTÞ;min GUðTÞ;PðTÞð Þð ÞjFQt
 
;
we have that GL(T)≤Y**(t)≤GU(T), and conclude that
erðTtÞ
Ð T
t
λðsÞdsGLðTÞgðtÞ≤XðtÞ≤ erðTtÞ
Ð T
t
λðsÞdsGUðTÞgðtÞ:
We now prove that X** is optimal.
Let V0(t, y) be the value function of the proposed solution:
V0ðt; yÞ=E  1
γ
eγYðTÞ j YðtÞ= y
 
:
We demonstrate the optimality of π** by demonstrating that V0 satisﬁes the Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman equation and that π** is the strategy which gives rise to Y(t). We are faced with the problem
that Y(t) is only deﬁned as a function of W(t) and t. We therefore write
V0 t;YðtÞð Þ=V0 t; η t;WðtÞð Þð Þ=V t;WðtÞð Þ;
so that
∂V
∂t
=
∂V0
∂t
+
∂V0
∂y
∂η
∂t
; (C1)
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∂V
∂w
=
∂V0
∂y
∂η
∂w
;
∂2V
∂w2
=
∂2V0
∂y2
∂η
∂w
 2
+
∂V0
∂y
∂2η
∂w2
: (C2)
Now
PðTÞ=Pð0Þ +R θT +WðTÞð Þ =D Pð0Þ +R θT +WðtÞ + ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃTtp Z ;
where Z is a standard normal random variable under the original probability measure ℙ. As a result,
PðTÞ>GUðTÞ , Z>DUðt;wÞ =def dUðt;wÞθ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp
(DL follows similarly from P(T)<GL(T)). Given the previous deﬁnition, we get
V t;wð Þ=E  1
γ
eγYðTÞ jWðtÞ=w
 
= 1
γ
ðDL
1
eγGLðTÞϕðzÞdz +
ð1
DU
eγGUðTÞϕðzÞdz

+
ðDU
DL
eγ Pð0Þ +RðθT +w +
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
zÞð ÞϕðzÞdz

= 1
γ
eγGLðTÞΦðDLÞ + eγGUðTÞ 1ΦðDUÞð Þ

+ eγPð0Þ
1
2θ
2ðT + tÞθw ΦðDU + θ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
ÞΦðDL + θ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
Þ
 
;
with
∂V
∂w
= 1
γ
eγGUðTÞ
ϕðDUÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp e
γGLðTÞ ϕðDLÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp θe
γPð0Þ12θ2ðT + tÞθw ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞð Þ

eγPð0Þ12θ2ðT + tÞθw ϕðdUÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp 
ϕðdLÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp
 
:
As
ϕðDUÞ= e
12d2U + θdU
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tt
p
12θ2ðTtÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2π
p =ϕðdUÞe12θ2ðTtÞ + γGUðTÞγPð0Þθwθ2t
=ϕðdUÞeγGUðTÞγPð0Þ12θ2ðT + tÞθw
(similarly for DL), we get that
∂V
∂w
=ReγPð0Þ
1
2θ
2ðT + tÞθw ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞð Þ
and, consequently,
∂2V
∂w2
=ReγPð0Þ
1
2θ
2ðT + tÞθw θ ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞð Þ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp ϕðdUÞϕðdLÞð Þ
 
:
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Then, from equation (C2),
∂V0
∂y
= eγPð0Þ
1
2θ
2ðT + tÞθw;
∂2V0
∂y2
=
∂2V
∂w2  ∂V0∂y ∂
2η
∂w2
∂η
∂w
 2 =γ eγPð0Þ12θ2ðT + tÞθwΦðdUÞΦðdLÞ ;
and from equation (C1),
∂V0
∂t
= eγPð0Þ
1
2θ
2ðT + tÞθw Rθ
2
ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞð Þ + R
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp ϕðdUÞϕðdLÞð Þ
 
eγPð0Þ12θ2ðT + tÞθw Rθ ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞð Þ + R
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Ttp ϕðdUÞϕðdLÞð Þ
 
=Rθ
2
eγPð0Þ
1
2θ
2ðT + tÞθw ΦðdUÞΦðdLÞð Þ;
from which
∂V0
∂t
 θ
2
2
∂V0
∂y
 2
∂2V0
∂y2
= 0
follows. Hence, the value function satisﬁes the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation: we conclude that
this must be the optimal strategy.
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